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FELIX COHEN ON LEGISLATION
Michael S. Green*
Abstract
Felix Cohen's and Walter Wheeler Cook's prediction theory of law was a
fundamentally positivist theory, according to which the law of a jurisdiction is
reducible to regularities of official behavior. Cohen used the prediction theory to
argue for philosophical anarchism - that is, the view that the existence of law
does not entail a duty, even a prima facie duty, of obedience. In particular, Cohen
extended philosophical anarchism to adjudication. The fact that officials in a
jurisdiction regularly behave in a certain way does not give a judge adjudicating a
case a moral reason to do the same. In deciding whether she should follow the
law, a judge must always engage in particularized moral deliberation.
Philosophical anarchism is a normative position concerning adjudication. But it
also suggests a descriptive position. Cohen argued that the law often fails to have
a causal effect on adjudication, not because it is rationally indeterminate (in the
sense of failing to recommend a unique decision) but because judges resist the
law on moral - or perceived moral - grounds. As a result, Cohen argued that
legislation cannot be assessed solely on the basis of its expressed content. Any
evaluation of legislation must consider law resistance, not merely by those subject
to the law's commands, but also by those officials tasked with administering the
law.
Keywords
Felix Cohen; Walter Wheeler Cook; legal realism; legislation; prediction theory
of law; philosophical anarchism
A. LEITER AND THE 'RECEIVED VIEW' OF LEGAL REALISM
The American legal realists tended to focus on how judges respond to and
produce law through adjudication. Teasing out their views about legislation is a
difficult matter, which is why this special issue devoted to the topic is so
welcome. In this essay, I will consider Felix Cohen's views on legislation. (I will
* Michael S. Green is Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law at the College of William & Mary.
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have a bit to say about Walter Wheeler Cook as well, but my primary emphasis
will be Cohen.) In exploring Cohen's views, I will rely upon the reading of the
realists that I have presented in other writings.' I'll begin, therefore, with an
account of this reading, by contrasting it both with what Brian Leiter calls the
'Received View' of the movement and with Leiter's alternative.
For Leiter, the 'Core Claim' of legal realism is that judges respond 'primarily
to the stimulus of facts' and to 'non-legal reasons' - such as fairness to the parties
- rather than to the applicable rules of law. 2 The realists accepted the Core Claim
because they thought the law is rationally indeterminate, that is, that it is
insufficient 'to justify only one outcome'. Judges must look outside the law
because it fails to provide them with sufficient guidance.
Although the Received View of the movement accepts the Core Claim, Leiter
objects to the way that it formulates the Claim. According to the Received View:
Legal Realism is fundamentally: (1) a descriptive theory about the nature of
judicial decisions, according to which, (2) judges exercise unfettered
discretion, in order (3) to reach results based on their personal tastes and
values, which (4) they then rationalize after-the-fact with appropriate legal
rules and reasons. 4
The problem, as Leiter sees it, is in theses (2) and (3). Thesis (2) is mistaken
because the realists did not think that judges' discretion is unfettered, in the sense
of being completely unconstrained by legal rules. The law is not globally
indeterminate, that is, indeterminate in all cases. Indeterminacy is local -
'5
primarily only in cases that make it to 'the stage of appellate review'.
Furthermore, even in appellate cases, a judge's options are restricted to some
extent by the applicable legal rules. Leiter argues that thesis (3) is also mistaken
because - Jerome Frank and Joseph Hutcheson excepted - the realists did not
think that judges' decisions are based upon personal tastes and values.6 Judges'
decisions are not idiosyncratic. Instead, judges respond predictably to cases on
the basis of shared views about the relevant non-legal considerations.
Another important difference between Leiter's reading of the realists and past
readings concerns the prediction theory of law, which Leiter describes as an
'account of the concept of law according to which, "The law is just a prediction
of what a court will do" or "The law is just whatever a court says it is on the
1 M.S. Green, 'Leiter on the Legal Realists' (2011) 30 Law & Philosophy 381; M.S. Green, 'Legal
Realism as Theory of Law' (2005) 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1915.
2 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal




6 ibid. 16, 25 and 28.
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present occasion"'. Past interpreters have generally attributed a prediction theory
to the realists, although it is usually added that the theory is implausible or
incoherent.8 Leiter argues that the realists could not have been committed to the
theory, because it is incompatible with their claims about legal indeterminacy.
The realists claimed that the law - including statutes and past judicial decisions -
is rationally indeterminate. They therefore must have been committed to the view
that statutes and past judicial decisions - not merely the decision the court will
make in the immediate case - are the law.9 Leiter argues that what appears to be
the expression of the prediction theory in the realists' writings 'is not a claim
about the "concept" of law, but rather a claim about how it is useful to think about
law for attorneys who must advise clients what to do'. 10
Concerning the realists' views about legal indeterminacy, my reading largely
overlaps with Leiter's. I agree with him, for example, that theses (2) and (3) of
the Received View are mistaken. The realists' indeterminacy thesis was not global
(even if it was not precisely limited to cases that make it to appeal). The realists
recognized that the law sometimes recommends a unique decision to a judge,
given the facts of the case. Furthermore, they generally did not think that in those
cases in which the law is indeterminate, judicial decisions are based on personal
values. They thought judges predictably adjudicate upon the basis of shared views
concerning non-legal considerations."
The heart of my disagreement with Leiter has to do with the prediction theory
of law (or rather prediction theories, for - as we shall see - at least two prediction
theories can be identified in the realists' works). There is overwhelming evidence
that, by speaking of the law in terms of judicial decisions and predictions of
decisions, the realists were concerned with more than how it is useful for lawyers
to think about the law when advising their clients. 12 The realists claimed that the
prediction theory applies to a judge adjudicating a case just as much as it does to
lawyers advising their clients.13 By offering the theory, they hoped to reveal
something important and essential about the nature of law. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Leiter is virtually alone in claiming that the realists were not
committed to a prediction theory of law.
To be sure, Leiter is correct that the realists must have relied on a
conventional theory of law, in which statutes and precedent can be law, when
making their claims about legal indeterminacy. But that is not enough to show
B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal
Philosophy (OUP 2007) 69.
8 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn., OUP 1994) 124-154; J.G. Murphy and J.L. Coleman,
The Philosophy ofLaw: An Introduction to Jurisprudence (Westview 1990) 34.
9 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal
Philosophy (OUP 2007) 72-73.
'o ibid. 71
1 M.S. Green, 'Leiter on the Legal Realists' (2011) 30 Law & Philosophy 381, 384-389.
12 ibid. 403-416.
" ibid. 405-406 and 410.
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that they didn't offer a prediction theory. First - as we shall see - the prediction
theory might be compatible with the view that statutes and precedent are law.
Second, even if the prediction theory is incompatible with the usual view about
the scope of the law, the realists might have offered the theory as useful
reformation of the concept of law. The realists clearly recognized that there was a
conventional concept of law - which they called 'law in books', 'formal law',
'Bealish Law' (after Joseph H. Beale), and 'paper rules' - in the light of which
statutes and precedent were law. 14 The fact that their claims about legal
indeterminacy were made in reference to this conventional concept does not mean
that they didn't think that the prediction theory (or 'law in action')1 5 was a
superior alternative.
The question therefore is not whether the realists held the prediction theory,
but why - something past readings of the realists have not adequately explained.
In addressing this matter, it is useful to draw a distinction between two forms that
the theory took in the realists' writings.
B. THE DECISION THEORY OF LAW
The first is a decision theory of law, in which the law concerning an event is
whatever concrete judgment a court will issue when the event is litigated. This
theory, which is most evident in the writings of Jerome Frank, is indeed
incompatible with the view that statutes and precedent are law. Although the
decision theory was not advocated by Felix Cohen (or Walter Wheeler Cook), it is
helpful to outline briefly the possible reasons some realists held the theory.
One is legal indeterminacy. To the extent that the relevant legal rules - that is,
statutes, precedent, and the like - are indeterminate, a judge adjudicating a case
must make law to fill in the gaps. If the realists believed in global legal
indeterminacy, they might be inclined to say that the law consists of the concrete
decisions of courts. Imagine that the relevant legal rules never give judges any
guidance about how a case should be resolved. If so, there would be some sense
in the claim that the law really consists of how a judge would decide the case,
since it is only through such a decision that the parties could have any concrete
guidance about their legal obligations.
But it is unlikely that legal indeterminacy was the primary motivation for the
realists' decision theory. The reason is that, as Leiter emphasizes, the realists did
not believe that legal indeterminacy is global. Indeed if they did, their decision
14 F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism
(Greenwood 1976) 237. See also J. Frank, 'What Courts Do in Fact: Part One' (1931) 26 Ill. L. Rev.
645, 648; J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Anchor Books 1963) 59; K.N. Llewellyn, 'A Realistic
Jurisprudence: The Next Step' (1930) 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 448.
"s ibid. 237.
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theory would collapse. We can identify courts only on the basis of preexisting
legal rules. These rules must be able to provide meaningful direction or we would
never be able to identify the judicial decisions to which the decision theory
purports to reduce the law.
Furthermore, even if the realists did believe that global indeterminacy was
true of the American legal system, the resulting decision theory would not be a
genuine theory of law - that is, an account of what is essential to law. Unless
global legal indeterminacy is necessarily true, the theory would not be true of
every possible legal system.
An alternative explanation of the realists' advocacy of the decision theory -
one offered by H.L.A. Hart - ties the theory to the phenomenon of judicial
supremacy. Assume that the law is completely determinate. The fact remains that
if a judge misapplies the law, her judgment is generally considered binding upon
the parties, unless overturned on appeal. 16 This power to issue binding judgments
in defiance of the applicable legal rules is commonly known as weak judicial
supremacy. In addition, in the American legal system the highest court of appeals
also generally has strong supremacy, in the sense that its misinterpretations of the
law are considered binding upon officials in similar cases in the future. Officials
are bound to replace the language of the legal rule with the court's
misinterpretation.
These two forms of judicial supremacy give judges a type of freedom of
decision that is unrelated to legal indeterminacy. To be sure, the freedom is not
unlimited. A judge's misapplication of the law might be so profound (she, for
example, might read the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as
demanding that her salary be increased by $1 million a year) that weak judicial
supremacy would not apply. Her judgment could permissibly be ignored by
officials even if it had not been overturned on appeal. There are, one might say,
misapplications of the law that undermine the status of the court's decision as a
judgment at all.' 7 By the same token, a highest court of appeals' misinterpretation
of the law might be so extreme that strong judicial supremacy would not apply.
American officials would be legally permitted (or required) to ignore the
misinterpretation in future cases. Nevertheless, the simple fact that a judge
misapplied or misinterpreted a determinate legal rule is not on its own sufficient
for officials to deny the judge's decision legal effect.
Given the existence ofjudicial supremacy, there is again some sense in saying
that the law consists of how a judge will decide a particular case. And it is clear,
16 e.g. Th.W. Merrill, 'Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments' (1993)
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 43, 46.
17 M.S. Green, 'Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes about Discontinuity in the Legal Order' (2005) 83
N.C.L. Rev. 331, 393-394.
The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Vol. 1, No. 1
118 Green
particularly in Jerome Frank's writings, that judicial supremacy sometimes
motivated the realists to present a decision theory.1 8
But there are problems with this version of the decision theory as well. Once
again, it is not a genuine theory of law, for a legal system need not recognize
judicial supremacy and - as we have seen - even in those systems with judicial
supremacy, there are limits on the extent to which officials will give deference to
judicial decisions that misapply or misinterpret the law. Second, the decision
theory cannot apply to those fundamental legal rules that identify courts and their
decisions. Although it is possible for a court to use its supremacy to increase (or
decrease) its jurisdiction by misinterpreting existing legal rules on the matter, for
judicial supremacy to function, nonjudicial officials must engage in the threshold
application of legal rules to identify courts and their jurisdiction. Concerning this
threshold application, judicial supremacy cannot coherently apply.
Furthermore, even in those areas where weak judicial supremacy applies, the
fact that a court's judgment is legally binding upon other officials does not
necessarily mean that it establishes the law. As H.L.A. Hart argued, participants in
a legal system can understand the court's judgment as binding despite being
legally in error. If so, the judgment would not change the prevailing legal rules,
even concerning the event in connection with which the judgment was issued.19
The same point is true about strong judicial supremacy. It is possible for the
participants in the legal system to draw a distinction between the law and the
court's binding interpretation of the law. The court's opinion can be understood as
binding upon officials going forward despite being legally in error.
C. THE PREDICTION THEORY OF LAW
So much for the decision theory. But there was a very different theory of law
offered by the realists - which we can call the prediction theory - that did not
depend upon legal indeterminacy or judicial supremacy. Consider the following
statements made by Walter Wheeler Cook:
[W]e must as always guard ourselves against thinking of our assertion that
'rights' and other legal relations 'exist' or have been 'enforced' as more than a
conventional way of describing past and predicting future behavior of human
beings -judges and other officials. 20
8 M.S. Green, 'Leiter on the Legal Realists' (2011) 30 Law & Philosophy 381, 389-391; M.S. Green,
'Legal Realism as Theory of Law' (2005) 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1915, 1987-1993.
9 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn., OUP 1994) 141-146.
20 W.W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases ofthe Conflict ofLaws (HUP 1942) 33.
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[A] statement, for example, that a certain 'rule of law' is the 'law of England'
is (...) merely a more or less convenient shorthand way of saying that, on the
basis of certain observations of past phenomena, we predict certain future
behavior of the appropriate English officials.21
Cook used the prediction theory to criticize the prevailing view about a court's
legal duty to apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction. According to the vested rights
or 'obligatio' theory, if a jurisdiction enacts a law concerning activities in its
territory, a violation of the law gives the wronged party a vested right to the
application of the jurisdiction's law, which foreign courts taking the case are
legally obligated to respect.22 This obligation transcends social facts in the forum,
in the sense that the forum court is legally obligated to respect the foreign right no
matter what forum officials say or do.
Cook used the prediction theory to critique this notion of vested rights. A right
legally binding upon the forum, he argued, must be tied to social facts about
forum officials. This means that there are as many legal rights concerning an
event as there are jurisdictions willing to adjudicate in favor of the plaintiff, even
when the event being litigated has no connection with the forum. There are no
necessary limits on the territorial scope of a jurisdiction's law:
Shall we, must we, say that there are as many 'rights', all growing out of the
one group of facts under consideration, as there are jurisdictions which will
give the plaintiff relief? Since such an assertion is merely a shorthand way of
making the prophecy that the appropriate persons, the officials, in each of
these jurisdictions would react to the situation, if it were presented to them, so
as to 'give relief to the plaintiff, there seems to be no other statement to
make. Thus interpreted, the statement is not only not startling but plain
common sense.23
Notice that there is nothing in Cook's argument that depends upon legal
indeterminacy or judicial supremacy. Rather, Cook offers the prediction theory of
law as a fundamentally positivist account of the law - that is, an account in terms
of social facts in a jurisdiction. The problem with vested rights theory according
to Cook is that it assumed the existence of legal rules (in particular, rules limiting
the territorial scope of a jurisdiction's law) that did not depend upon such social
facts.
Notice as well that Cook's prediction theory is not the same as the decision
theory. Under the decision theory, the law concerning an event is how the court
that gets the case will in fact adjudicate it. The prediction theory, in contrast,
looks beyond a court's actual decision in two ways: it looks to the behavior of
21 W.W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases ofthe Conflict ofLaws (HUP 1942) 29.
2 ibid. 34-39.
23 ibid. 33.
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officials (not just judges) and to officials generally (not the behavior of any
particular official). To the extent that the judge that gets a case diverges from
officials in general, the judge has diverged from the law. Indeed, Cook even looks
beyond the behavior of officials to the citizenry as a whole. It is not enough that
officials predictably act in certain ways. The population as a whole must
acquiesce in the officials' actions for law to exist.24
So understood, the prediction theory may not be incompatible with a
conventional understanding of the law as including statutes and precedents. If
statutes and precedents are predictably enforced by officials in a jurisdiction and
the population as a whole generally abides by them, there is a sense in which they
are law under the prediction theory.
To be sure, there are differences between the prediction theory and other
positivist accounts of law. Consider H.L.A. Hart's theory of law, as presented in
The Concept ofLaw. Hart insists that officials' attitudes, not merely behavior, are
relevant to the existence of law. For a statute to be law, it is not enough that
officials predictably enforce it and the population generally abides by it. Officials
must take the 'internal point of law' - that is, they must enforce the statute
because it satisfies criteria that they have accepted as appropriately governing
their actions. 25 Under the prediction theory, in contrast, it does not appear
essential to law that officials adopt the internal point of view. They might, for
example, all act as they do simply because of fear of reprisals for disobedience.
Second, under the prediction theory statements about the law are about social
facts. For this reason, a statute, understood as a propositional entity or a norm, is
not, strictly speaking, law. To say a statute is law is really an elliptical way of
speaking about social facts concerning official behavior and popular
acquiescence. For Hart, in contrast, officials' statements about the law of their
own legal system do not describe but instead presuppose social facts about
officials and the citizenry and are normative in the sense that they express the
speaker's acceptance of the legal system.26 Thus, under Hart's theory, when an
official says that a statute is law, she is genuinely speaking of the statute as a
norm. Indeed, Hart criticized legal realism because it treated legal statements
solely as descriptions of social facts.27
There is another possible difference between the prediction theory and Hart's.
Under Hart's theory, something can be law only if it satisfies the criteria to which
officials actually appeal when justifying their actions, criteria that Hart calls the
'rule of recognition' of the legal system.28 A statute is law if it satisfies these
2 W.W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (fUP 1942) 30 fn. 54: "If, for
example, a majority of the community were not in the habit of acquiescing in the acts of the officials,
there would be not law but the absence of law."
25 M.S. Green, 'Leiter on the Legal Realists' (2011) 30 Law & Philosophy 381, 414-415; M.S. Green,
'Legal Realism as Theory of Law' (2005) 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1915, 1997-1998.
26 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw (2nd edn., OUP 1994) 102-103.
27 ibid. 104.
28 ibid. 94.
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official criteria, even if the statute is, as a matter of fact, ignored by judges when
adjudicating cases. Conversely, something is not law, even if it is a regular
determinant of courts' decisions, if it fails to satisfy the official criteria for law.
The prediction theory, on the other hand, might treat as relevant all and only
those considerations that actually have systematic effects on courts' decisions (or
other official action). Consider the obligation of good faith in contractual dealing,
which Karl Llewellyn thought regularly motivated decisions in contract cases,
even though it was not a reason explicitly identified as law.29 Under Hart's theory
the obligation would not be law. In contrast, some realists, applying the prediction
theory, would call it law. These realists recognized, however, that in calling it law
they were recommending that the concept of law be reformed, rather than
identifying the scope of the concept as it is currently employed.
D. THE PREDICTION THEORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM
As we have seen, Cook introduced the prediction theory in the context of the
conflict of laws. The existence of a foreign legal right simply means that an event
will be treated in a certain way by foreign legal officials. Such social facts do not
necessarily generate any legal restrictions on the forum. The legal rights of the
parties as far as the forum is concerned is solely a question of social facts about
the forum's legal officials.
But the prediction theory also has implications for how a court treats domestic
legal rights.3' Under the prediction theory, the existence of a domestic legal right
is simply a question of the behavior of domestic officials. For the judge
adjudicating the case, it is merely a descriptive fact. Nothing about this fact tells
the court how it ought to behave.
The realist who most emphasized this argument is Felix Cohen. Cohen argued
that the law, as a set of social facts, does not give a court a moral reason to
adjudicate one way rather than another. Even when the law is fully determinate, it
cannot on its own tell a judge how to decide a case, for it does not answer the
question of whether the judge should decide in accordance with the law:
Intellectual clarity requires that we carefully distinguish between the two
problems of (1) objective description, and (2) critical judgment, which
classical jurisprudence lumps under the same phrase. Such a distinction
realistic jurisprudence offers with the double-barreled thesis: (1) that every
29 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal
Philosophy (OUP 2007) 30.
30 M.S. Green, 'Leiter on the Legal Realists' (2011) 30 Law & Philosophy 381, 406-407. Cohen's
position on the matter is equivocal. F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the
Foundations of Legal Criticism (Greenwood 1976) 236-238.
31 ibid. 397; W.W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases ofthe Conflict ofLaws (HUP 1942) 43-45.
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legal rule or concept is simply a function of judicial decisions to which all
questions of value are irrelevant, and (2) that the problem of the judge is not
whether a legal rule or concept actually exists but whether it ought to exist.
Clarity on two fronts is the result.32
The problem with past conceptions of the law, Cohen argued, is that they
muddled the descriptive question of what the law is with the moral question of
how a judge should adjudicate in the light of the law. Sometimes this undermined
accurate description of the law: "If legislatures or courts disagree with a given
theory, it is a simple matter to show that this disagreement is unjust,
unreasonable, monstrous and, therefore, not 'sound law'." But past conceptions
of the law also undermined the moral evaluation of the law. Judges would take
the fact that the law exists to answer the question of how they ought to adjudicate:
"[I]f the law is something that commands what is right and prohibits what is
wrong, it is impossible to argue about the goodness or badness of any law, and
any definition that deters people from criticism of the law is very useful to legal
apologists for the existing order of society."34
The prediction theory forces judges to face the fact that adjudication is always
a moral decision that cannot be answered by determining existing law. Under the
prediction theory, '[t]he ghost-world of supernatural legal entities to whom courts
delegate the moral responsibility of deciding cases vanishes; in its place we see
legal concepts as patterns of judicial behavior, behavior which affects human
35lives for better or worse and is therefore subject to moral criticism'.
Like Cook, Cohen did not argue for the prediction theory on the basis of legal
indeterminacy. Indeed, Cohen criticized other realists for exaggerating the extent
to which the law is indeterminate.3 6 Nor did Cohen's argument for the prediction
theory depend upon judicial supremacy. He did not reduce the law to how a judge
actually decides a case. If a judge's decision deviates from how other judges and
officials would treat the case, her decision deviates from the law. 37 To be sure,
given judicial supremacy, her decision will remain legally binding, unless
overturned on appeal. But this legal effect of her decision is, for Cohen, itself a
function of regularities of behavior among officials - including the non-judicial
officials who enforce the decision.38 In the absence of such regularity there is no





36 F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism
(Greenwood 1976) 238.
7 M.S. Green, 'Legal Realism as Theory of Law' (2005) 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1915, 1934.
38 F.S. Cohen, 'Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach' (1935) 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809,
844.
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judicial decision at all. The heart of Cohen's prediction theory was not legal
indeterminacy or judicial supremacy, but a fundamentally positivist approach to
the law as constituted by social facts.
In arguing that the law does not generate moral obligations on a judge to
adjudicate one way rather than another, Cohen did not deny, of course, that there
are often - indeed usually - good moral reasons for adjudicating as the law
recommends. For example, he noted that adjudication in accordance with law will
often uphold 'human expectations based upon past decisions, the stability of
economic transactions, and the maintenance of order and simplicity in our legal
system' .40 But he thought that there was no necessary relationship between the
existence of law and reasons to adjudicate in accordance with the law. Identifying
such reasons always requires particularized moral deliberation:
[T]he ethical value of certainty and predictability in law may outweigh more
immediate ethical values, but this is no denial of the ethical nature of the
problem. Consistency (...) is relevant to such a problem only as an indication
of the interest in legal certainty, and its value and significance are ethical
rather than logical. The question, then, of how far one ought to consider
precedent and statute in coming to a legal decision is purely ethical. The
proposition that courts ought always to decide 'in accordance with precedent
or statute' is an ethical proposition the truth of which can be demonstrated
only by showing that in every case the following of precedent or statute does
less harm than any possible alternative.41
I have argued elsewhere that Cohen's position amounts to extending
philosophical anarchism - that is, the view that there is no moral duty to conform
42to the law - from private citizens to judges adjudicating cases. For the
philosophical anarchist, the existence of law does not on its own create a moral
duty of obedience. It does not even create a prima facie duty, that is, a duty that
might be defeated by countervailing moral duties. If philosophical anarchism
applies to judges, that means that there is nothing about being in the position of a
judge that necessarily entails a prima facie moral duty to adjudicate in accordance
with the law.
That Cohen would adopt philosophical anarchism concerning adjudication is
understandable given his largely consequentialist ethical perspective.43 The moral
3 F.S. Cohen, 'The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence', (1937) 1 M.L.R. 5, 8 (reducing the law
to regularities of, not just judicial decisions, not also "other acts of state-force").
4 F.S. Cohen, 'Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach' (1935) 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809,
840.
41 F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism
(Greenwood 1976) 33.
42 M.S. Green, 'Legal Realism as Theory of Law' (2005) 46 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1915, 1925-1926.
43 e.g. F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism
(Greenwood 1976) 51-52.
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advisability of adjudicating in accordance with the law depends upon its effects,
and what effects an act produces is always a contingent matter. Indeed, even if
Cohen recognized non-consequentialist prima facie duties to adjudicate in
accordance with the law - for example, those flowing from a judge's promise as
part of her oath of office44 - a judge would not necessarily have these duties by
virtue of holding her position, although being a judge and possessing the duties
would, of course, usually coincide.
Philosophical anarchism is a normative position concerning the law. In
attributing it to the realists, therefore, I depart from both Leiter's reading and the
Received View, both of which treat realism as primarily a descriptive claim about
adjudication, according to which the law fails to have a causal effect on how
judges resolve cases because it does not recommend a unique decision to them.
Nevertheless, by emphasizing the lack of a necessary relationship between the
existence of law and moral reasons to adjudicate in accordance with the law, my
reading does suggest that the realists held a descriptive account of adjudication -
different from Leiter's and the Received View - according to which the law fails
to have a causal effect on how judges resolve cases, not because it fails to
recommend a unique decision to them, but because they find insufficient moral
reasons to adjudicate in accordance with the law. To be sure, simply because there
is no necessary relationship between the existence of law and moral reasons for a
judge to adjudicate as the law recommends, it does not follow that the law's
causal effect on adjudication will be reduced, for judges might wrongly believe
such a necessary relationship exists or might adjudicate in accordance with law
blindly, without considering whether it is morally justified. Philosophical
anarchism merely suggests the possibility that judges resist applying the law due
to moral objections. It does not show that they actual do so. Nevertheless, the
normative position of philosophical anarchism highlights the descriptive
possibility that judges choose, for actual or perceived moral reasons, to ignore the
law.
Leiter recognizes as a minor theme in the realists' writings that even
determinate law can fail to have a causal effect on adjudication. Curiously,
however, he offers only 'ineptitude or corruption' as the explanation.45 Any
'rational, honest, competent, and error-free' judge, he argues, will adjudicate as
determinate legal rules recommend.46 He ignores the possibility that a judge
might ignore determinate legal rules on legitimate moral grounds.
4 Cohen notes that judges often take their acceptance of their office as putting upon them a duty of
loyalty to the legal order. F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations
of Legal Criticism (Greenwood 1976) 241-242. But I have not been able to find him saying that they
are right.
45 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal
Philosophy (OUP 2007) 64.
4 ibid. 9.
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E. THE PREDICTION THEORY APPLIED TO LEGISLATION
With Cohen's account of adjudication in mind, we can now attempt to tease out
his views concerning legislation. As realism is usually understood - that is, as a
claim about the causal inefficacy of legal rules due to their rational indeterminacy
- not much interesting about the act of legislation follows. The most one can say
is that legislation can, as a descriptive matter, suffer from the same rational
indeterminacy as judge-made law and that, as a normative matter, it is best when
it overcomes this indeterminacy.
But what would Cohen say about legislation under my reading? One might
think that the consequences of the prediction theory for legislation are relatively
minor as well. After all, everyone agrees that a legislator generally engages in
autonomous moral reasoning. Legislation is the attempt to bring about good
moral consequences within certain social constraints. What is radical about my
reading is that Cohen applied this same perspective to a judge.
To be sure, it would also follow from my reading that, for Cohen, a legislator
should have the same attitude toward the law governing his activities that a judge
should have toward the law governing hers. Just as the existence of a statute does
not give a judge a moral reason to adjudicate in accordance with the statute, the
existence of, say, a constitutional restriction does not give a legislator a moral
reason to take the restriction into account. To say that a constitutional restriction
exists is simply a descriptive claim about social facts concerning official
behavior. What a legislator should do in response requires particularized moral
reasoning. (I have not been able to find Cohen making such a claim, but it is a
natural consequence of his prediction theory.)
But the prediction theory has another important implication for a normative
theory of legislation. As we have seen, by drawing a distinction between the law,
as a set of social facts, and the moral reasons judges have to adjudicate in
accordance with the law, the prediction theory draws attention to the possibility
that legal rules can fail to have a causal effect on judicial decisions, not because
they are indeterminate, but because judges resist applying them due to moral, or
perceived moral, objections. Any assessment of legislation must take into account
this phenomenon.
Cohen forcefully criticized those assessing statutes for ignoring law
resistance. Statutes are generally evaluated solely on the basis of their expressed
content:
A rule of law commanding or permitting a good thing or prohibiting a bad
thing is held to be good, and a rule commanding or permitting a bad thing or
prohibiting a good thing, bad. All questions of the actual extent to which law
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will secure obedience and of the actual nature and results of this degree of
obedience are held to be irrelevant to our value judgments. 47
Furthermore, to the extent that law resistance is considered, the emphasis is on
popular resistance, in which a statute is resisted by those to whom it is directed. 48
The evaluation of statutes and other legal rules ignores the 'personal moral
reactions of individuals to whom the administration of law is entrusted toward the
,49substance of the particular legal element'.
Once law resistance among judges and other officials is taken into account, a
statute with positive expressed content can be rejected, and one with negative
expressed content affirmed. As Cohen noted, this occurs when courts of appeals
assess the legal rules created by trial courts: "The appellate judge, aware of the
tenuous and sporadic nature of his control over lower courts, is inclined to
approach a case on appeal with some bias in favor of a judgment of affirmance."so
Despite finding the expressed content of the rule articulated by the lower court
deficient, the appellate court can be inclined toward accepting it, even in cases
where the appellate court's formal standard of review is de novo. But Cohen
argued that the same point should be true of legislation. A statute should be
accepted - despite the moral deficiencies of its expressed content - because of
anticipated judicial resistance to alternatives.
Law resistance by judges was a reason that the realists often recommended
replacing the language of a legal rule with the considerations that have been
actually driving judicial decisions. A classic example of such an approach is Karl
Llewellyn's inclusion of an obligation of good faith in contractual dealing in
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, on the ground that this criterion
was already being employed by courts in contract cases. Another example is the
Supreme Court's transformation of the law of personal jurisdiction over out-of-
state corporations in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,52 a decision that
appears strongly influenced by Cohen's article 'Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach'. 53 Cohen argued that the actual factors driving judicial
decisions in such cases were non-legal considerations such as the difficulties 'that
injured plaintiffs may encounter if they have to bring suit against corporate
defendants in the state of incorporation' and 'the possible hardship to
47 F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism




5i U.C.C. § 2-103(j).
52 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945).
5 G. Rutherglen, 'International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism' (2001) 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev.
347, 349-350.
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corporations of having to defend actions in many states'.5 In International Shoe
and subsequent cases,55 these non-legal considerations were incorporated into the
applicable legal rule.
It is my sense that Cohen's recommendation that the assessment of statutes
take into account law resistance is still largely being ignored. Statutes tend to be
evaluated on the basis of their expressed content. To the extent that law resistance
is considered, it is resistance by those to whom the statutes directly apply.
Crafting statutes to take into account resistance by the officials who enforce the
law is, as Cohen put it, still thought to be vaguely 'obscene'.
I would like to end by considering one more question about Cohen's attitude
toward legislation. This concerns how judges respond, and should respond, to
legislation, compared to judge-created law. As we have seen, Cohen argued that
the existence of law does not entail moral reasons for a judge to adjudicate as the
law recommends. Whether a judge has reasons to follow the law is a contingent
question requiring particularized moral reasoning. He gives us no reason to think
that this is any less true when a judge is considering legislation as opposed to
judge-made law. Nevertheless, it might be the case that she has moral reasons to
abide by legislation more often than judge-made law, or that these reasons, when
they exist, are more weighty. Since democratically-enacted legislation expresses
other citizens' views about the appropriate content of legal rules, she might give
the statute greater weight in her deliberation about how to adjudicate, even when
she thinks the content of the legislation is morally misguided.
After considerable searching, however, I have not been able to find Cohen
expressing such a position. This reveals, I believe, a significant gap in his
normative views on adjudication. Cohen - adopting a broadly consequentialist
approach - emphasized a judge's obligation to consider the effects of her actions
when determining whether she should adjudicate in accordance with law. He does
not draw attention to broader moral considerations that would recommend that
she defer to the views of her fellow citizens.
In offering this criticism, I do not mean to suggest that Cohen's philosophical
anarchist position is incorrect. Particularized moral reasoning is still required to
determine whether adjudication in accordance with a statute is morally justified.
The question is simply what sorts of considerations this reasoning might take into
account.
54 F.S. Cohen, 'Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach' (1935) 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809,
810. In International Shoe, the reason the original legal rule was ignored was largely its rational
indeterminacy, however, rather than judges' law resistance.
ss e.g. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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This normative gap in Cohen's account has a descriptive corollary. Just as
Cohen ignores the question of whether judges should defer to statutes more than
judge-made law, he also ignores the descriptive question of whether statutes in
fact have greater causal effect upon adjudication, precisely because judges feel
themselves to be more bound to comply with their demands. If so, the
phenomenon of law resistance would be less significant in connection with
statutes.
The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Vol.1, No. 1
